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AbstrAct
We report results from experimental water markets in which owners of two different sources of water supply 
water to households and farmers. The final water quality consumed by each type of consumer is determined 
through mixing of qualities from two different resources. We compare the standard duopolistic market struc-
ture with an alternative market clearing mechanism inspired by games with confirmed strategies (which have 
been shown to yield collusive outcomes). as in the static case, complex dynamic markets operating under a 
confirmed proposals protocol yield less efficient outcomes because coordination among independent suppli-
ers has the usual effects of restricting output and increasing prices to the users. our results suggest that, when 
market mechanisms are used to allocate water to its users, the rule of thumb used by competition authorities 
can also serve as a guide towards water market regulation.
keywords
Allocation of water; Dynamic duopoly; Endogenous water quality; Games with confirmed proposals.
resumeN
Se presentan resultados de un experimento con mercados acuíferos en el que los propietarios de agua de 
distinta calidad la ofrecen a hogares y agricultores. La calidad finalmente consumida por cada tipo de consu-
midor se determina a partir de una mezcla de las dos calidades. Se compara el duopolio estándar con una 
forma alternativa de cerrar el mercado que está inspirada en los juegos con propuestas confirmadas, que 
consiguen resultados relativamente más colusivos. como en el caso estático, los mercados dinámicos y com-
plejos que operan bajo un protocolo de propuestas confirmadas son menos eficientes porque la coordinación 
entre oferentes independientes tiene los efectos de restringir el output y de provocar un crecimiento de los 
precios. Nuestros resultados sugieren que cuando los mecanismos de mercado se utilizan para distribuir el 
agua a sus usuarios, la regla utilizada por parte de las autoridades de la competencia puede servir también 
como guía para la regulación de los mercados acuíferos.
PAlAbrAs clAve
Calidad endógena del agua; Duopolio dinámico; Juegos con propuestas confirmadas.
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iNtroductioN*
In its 1993 policy paper (Water Resources Management) the World Bank states that the 
deterioration and scarcity of fresh water in recent times is due to the “failure to properly 
consider the economic value of water. Given that water is given little or no economic 
value it is misallocated and misused”. Thus, efficiency in water allocation is becoming 
of great importance for countries all over the world. The problem is difficult given that 
historically water has been treated as a social rather than an economic good. a need 
for a market based mechanism to allocate water efficiently is widely gaining accep-
tance. 
Water is a growing industry worldwide. recent estimates put the world water market 
at $300 billion, with the united States accounting for more than half that amount. Two 
of the fastest growing markets are in water rights and municipal water supply systems. 
The proper definition of property rights and delegation of water allocation to market 
mechanisms can alone not solve the problem. for example, it has been shown that com-
petitive water withdrawal can lead to overexploitation (Moench, 1992). Gordon (1954), 
meanwhile, showed that complete rent dissipation may occur from the exploitation of 
an open access resource, whereas a single owner internalizes exploitation externali-
ties, and would be more efficient. Experiments have been used by Walker,Gardner and 
Ostrom (1990), Walker and Gardner (1992) and Gardner, Moore, and Walker (1997) to 
study common pool resource problems. Mason and Philips (1997), for example, provide 
experimental evidence on the relationship between group size and the standing stock of 
a common resource. The general result is that there is an inverse relationship between 
the number of resource extractors and rent accrual. 
McCabe, Rassenti and Smith (1991) present a “smart” computer assisted market 
institution. This mechanism was designed to compute prices and allocations by applying 
an optimization algorithm that maximizes the possible gains from exchange, given a set 
of decentralized strategies. Using California as a case study, Murphy et al. (2000) test 
alternative institutional arrangements for a computer assisted “thin” spot market, showing 
that the “smart” uniform price double auction yields highly efficient outcomes, and that 
co-tenancy of pipeline nodes improves efficiency compared to a monopoly.
apart from identifying important shortcomings of decentralized exploitation of water 
resources, the studies mentioned above show that experiments can be a useful test 
bed to study alternative water management mechanisms (Walker, Gardner and Ostrom, 
1990; Walker and Gardner, 1992; murphy et al., 2000). Experiments can replicate impor-
tant characteristics of existing markets and test them in a laboratory setting at a minimal 
 * Acknowledgements: We gratefully acknowledge financial support by the Spanish Ministry of Science an 
Technology (ECO 2008-00977/ECON and 2008-04636/ECON), Junta de Andalucía (P07-SEJ-03155), Ban-
caixa (P1-1B2010-17), Instituto Universitario de Economía, Consolider-Ingenio 2010 and the Comunidad de 
Madrid (Excelencia).
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cost to the regulator. a common feature of the aforementioned studies is strategic inte-
raction between agents leading to extraction levels which diverge from the economically 
efficient ones.
A different and rather neglected source of inefficiencies in water allocation relates 
to the fact that the scope of water management is defined within limited geographical 
areas whose extension depends on administrative divisions of land. This is especially 
relevant in the case of water transfers across regions and joint management of water 
from different resources. In recent years, apart from mixing water from different sources, 
recycling is also creating situations in which different water qualities have to be mixed. In 
such cases, the management of water from different sources affects the quality of water 
that each farm or household receives. Usually, the quality of water for household use 
must satisfy specific quality requirements. On the contrary, quality standards for farm use 
are much weaker. Thus, any authority supplying water to two different types of users who 
differ in their minimum acceptable qualities has an additional dimension to deal with: the 
optimal mix of qualities that should be supplied to users, implemented through the usual 
instrument of pricing by level of consumption.
In this paper we define a water market focusing on the novel feature of extraction 
from two different sources, leading to endogenous water quality1. We experimentally test 
the efficiency of two different market structures, labelled as duopoly and coordinated 
duopoly. our results indicate that a more competitive market environment yields more 
efficient outcomes than those achieved in the collusive environment of the coordinated 
duopoly structure. A more general implication of this finding is that when the market 
mechanism is used to allocate water to its users the usual rules of thumb apply. That 
is, collusion among independent suppliers inefficiently restricts output and raises prices 
to consumers. Generally speaking, water market regulation should not be permissive 
towards anti-competitive practices like explicit agreements or coordination of actions by 
independent suppliers.
a second contribution of the paper regards the mechanism used in the determination 
of the market clearing price. This issue has received a lot of attention in the literature 
(see, for example, Varela-Ortega, 1998; Tsur and Dinar, 1997, etc.) which (also see Bar-
Shira et al. 2006) seems to converge towards an agreement on the fact that uniform 
pricing is weakly more efficient than block-rate pricing. Our method is a combination of 
block-rate pricing and uniform pricing in the following sense: Suppliers post block-rate 
bids to the market, but the market clears through a uniform price determined by the price-
bid of the “last” block of each type of water consumed by the users. To implement this 
price formation mechanism, we programmed a “smart” agent representing the users. The 
agent allocates water among farmers and households in a way that maximizes consumer 
surplus conditional to the block-rate bids posted by the suppliers of the two different types 
 1 Modifying the market clearing mechanism in Georgantzis et al. (2004) and considering a different set of 
alternatives from those in García-Gallego et al. (forthcoming).
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of water. Therefore, despite the independent profit-driven action of suppliers, our setup 
assumes and implements conditional collective optimality of actions on the demand side. 
Finally, to our knowledge ours is the first paper in which a “confirmed strategies” 
protocol is used to implement a collusive environment in the framework of a dynamic 
experimental setting. Our findings show that, such a bargaining approach to coordina-
tion among independent suppliers is particularly efficient in inducing departures from the 
competitive outcome. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the aquifer system. In 
Section 3 we discuss our experimental design. Section 4 discusses the experimental 
results. Section 5 concludes.
tHe Aquifer system 
There are two renewable stocks SH (high quality) and Sl (low quality) from which water 
may be extracted. for the sake of simplicity, we assume that the recharge to the respec-
tive basin is deterministic and constant. The inflow to the respective basins is assumed 
to cease when the storage capacity of the aquifer is reached. That is, once the maximum 
storable stock is reached, extra water inflow is lost. The return flow of consumed water 
is assumed to be negligible. Thus, changes in the stocks are exclusively due to extrac-
tion and recharge. Extraction costs are supposed to be twice differentiable functions of 
quantity and stock size. First derivatives are assumed to be, respectively, positive and 
negative, whereas second derivatives are positive.
We allow for the possibility that the water resources differ in qualities. Quality of water 
in an aquifer may be lower due to marine intrusion, or due to infiltration of fertilizer from 
agriculture. Let the qualities be denoted respectively by QH and QL, where QH > QL >0. 
The two qualities are assumed to be constant over time. However, any intermediate qua-
lity may be supplied to the consumers as a result of mixing water from the two sources. 
Note that, usually, quality choice is studied in the context of static product differentiation 
models. In these models, product quality is chosen in a way which takes into account the 
competition-reducing effect of product differentiation. Thus, quality choice determines 
the fierceness of price competition. Here, the causality is reversed. Final product quality 
is the result of price setting behaviour. Thus, strategic interaction determines the final 
quality which is unique and not directly controlled by any single agent. 
Mixing quantities KH and Kl of the two qualities results in water whose quality is given 
by the weighted average:
(1)
Resource flow between the sources and the consumers is coordinated by a pair of 
€ 
QM (KH , KL ,QH ,QL ) =
KHQH +KLQL
KH +KL
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knots, which centralize the mixing process at the consumer’s location. figure 1 repre-
sents the distribution scheme described above.
Suppose that the behaviour of the consumers can be aggregated under one of two 
types: i) households (h), and ii) farmers (F). consumers differ in their respective prefe-
rences regarding the quality of water. Both types prefer a higher quality and quantity of 
the water to a lower one. Households consume water whose quality weakly exceeds a 
minimum standard. If mixed quality does not satisfy this condition, it will be subject to 
purification.
Quality of potable water should weakly exceed the constant minimum quality stan-
dard Qmin, where QH >Qmin >QL. Mixed water of quality QM may, or may not, satisfy the 
minimum quality standard. This depends on the quantities and the qualities which are 
mixed. Quality may be improved at a cost. This cost is an increasing function of the diffe-
rence between the quality before and after depuration. Moreover, a given improvement 
ΔQ of a lower quality is less costly than the same improvement performed on a higher 
quality. Let the initial quality subject to purification be Q0. The purification cost, denoted 
by CΔQ(K, ΔQ, Q0), for a certain water quality Q0 and quantity K=KH+KL requiring a quality 
improvement ΔQ, is assumed to satisfy the following conditions: 
         (2)
figure 1.
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Figure 1. The pipeline network. 
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∂CΔQ
∂K > 0,
∂ 2CΔQ
∂K 2 > 0,
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∂ CΔQ
∂ Q0 ΔQ
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∂ Q02 ΔQ
> 0
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The purification procedure is assumed to be costly enough such that it is not profitable 
to improve quality above the minimum standard. Hence, the quality consumed by house-
holds is the maximum between the minimum, and the mixed, quality. Thus, Q0 = QM and,
Our assumptions concerning consumer utility are qualitatively similar to those in 
Williams et al. (1986) on multiple commodities which are interdependent in consumption. 
Two features, which are rather specific to the dynamics of water, are added to the struc-
ture: first, buyers are restricted to purchase up to a certain amount of each type of water. 
Second, a constant inflow (recharge) in each period maintains the stock of water in the 
basins of each producer. In fact, following a standard formulation of similar groundwater 
extraction problems, a lower stock implies a higher extraction cost. Thus, each period’s 
marginal cost and past levels of extraction are positively correlated.
Let the households take the purification cost into account in their utility function. Fur-
ther, assume utility functions for the respective consumer-types, 
  Uh=Uh(Kh,QMh) and UF=UF(KF,QMF) 
  where Kh=KHh+KLh, and KF=KHF+KLF 
to be twice differentiable with respect to the quantity and the mixed quality. A farmers’ 
utility is increasing in both arguments. While depending on the purification cost function, 
the utility function of households might be increasing in the quantity of low quality only 
up to a certain limit2. from twice differentiability of the utility functions it follows that 
the sum of the functions is twice differentiable, too. The indirect social welfare function 
),( LH KKV , which maximizes consumer surplus for a given quantity of water, can be 
obtained as a solution to the following problem:
               
         
         (3)
 2 In fact, it will be increasing if mixed quality weakly exceeds the minimum quality standard.
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as a benchmark for our experimental results, we are interested in the socially optimal 
solution of water supply. Given the assumptions above, we formulate the program that 
maximizes social welfare.3 Without loss of generality, suppose that initially the resource 
stocks are in the natural hydrological equilibrium, i.e. at the upper bound of the storage 
capacity. Let ( LH aa , ) denote recharges of the two water qualities of water, and t0 the 
starting time of extraction. assume that the social rate of discount is δ. Thus, the inter-
temporal social objective function is formulated as follows:
Observe that in the case of a dynamic duopoly game played by water supply firms 
strategies aim at4:
 
       
       
       
 3 This problem is solvable by means of optimal control theory, where the stocks are the states and the 
quantities the control variables.
 4                 and               represent, respectively,  the reserve price for high and low quality suppliers. 
(4)
(5)
€ 
max
KH t ,KL t
e−δ t
t0
∞
∫ V (KH t ,KL t ) −CH t (KH t ,SH t ) −CL t (KL t ,SL t )[ ] dt
s.t.
(i) dSH td t =
−KH t + aH , if SH <SHmax
0, otherwise
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎩ 
(ii) dSL td t =
−KL t + aL , if SL <SLmax
0, otherwise
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎩ 
(iii) SH t0 =SHmax
(iv) SL t0 = SLmax
(i)    
(ii)   
s.t.
€ 
max
KHt
e−δt
t0
∞
∫ RH (KHt ) −CHt (KHt,SHt )[ ] dt 	  
)( LtL KR)( HtH KR
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for the supplier of high quality water, and,
for the low quality supplier, respectively, which in comparison with the social welfare static 
maximization shows that private managers do not account for each one’s water quality 
effect on the social value generated by the other quality. Following standard results from 
dynamic duopoly games, it can be shown that private water suppliers will reduce output 
with respect to the social optimum described above.
By means of the resulting current value Hamiltonian and pontryagin’s maximum prin-
ciple (assuming an interior solution) the two following conditions have to be satisfied in 
the hydro-economic equilibrium:
         (7)
The conditions in (7) simultaneously determine the steady-state standing-stocks of 
SH and Sl. They basically state that, in the long-run, the marginal social utility, which 
embodies the respective resource price in the economy, should equal the social costs of 
extraction represented on the right hand side.5 
However, a benevolent, infinitely living planner should equally care for the welfare 
of both present and future generations. This is the case actually implemented in our 
experiments because subject rewards depended equally on profits earned in earlier and 
later periods. In fact, a planner who is equally interested in present and future welfare 
will maximize efficiency in each period and will not sacrifice future efficiency in favour 
5 In each condition, the first term (positive) represents the marginal cost which results from extracting 
a quantity KH (KL) from the water stock SH (SL). The second term reflects the shadow price of the resource. 
(i)    
(ii)  
€ 
SLto = SL
max  
s.t.
	  
€ 
max
KLt
e−δt
t0
∞
∫ RL (KLt ) −CLt (KLt ,SLt )[ ]dt 	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of higher present extraction as implied by (7). Thus, formally, we are interested in the 
special case of δ=0, the conditions above then become: 
                                                                                 
         (8)
Given our formulation, the conditions in (8) imply that in order to implement the first-
best solution a social planner should never let the stock levels fall to the point where 
extraction costs become positive. This solution will, in general, differ from the one 
observed under independent private-profit driven management of the two resources. As 
a result, a private duopoly with independently acting suppliers will have incentives to 
extract less than predicted by the socially optimal solution described above. The collusive 
duopoly will further deviate from the socially optimal solution on the same direction as the 
standard duopolistic market towards the monopoly solution. Specifically, equilibrium for 
the non-cooperative duopolistic management structure is characterized by the condition: 
         
 
         (9)
where, rH and rl denote the two competing entities’ revenues, respectively. This resem-
bles the standard duopoly case. The left hand side in (9) fails to account for the negative 
externality of each type of water on the profitability of the other. That is, while the mono-
polist accounts for the effect of selling an extra unit of high quality water on the market 
price of low quality (and vice-versa), duopolists do not internalize the horizontal externa-
lity. for δ=0, the conditions in (9) become:
 
                                                                                                 
	  
	  
	  
 (10)
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exPerimeNtAl desiGN
our experimental setup aims at studying how different levels of competitiveness affect 
the efficiency of a duopolistic market supplying water to a heterogeneous population of 
consumers. Two different levels of competitiveness are implemented. a standard duopo-
listic structure is compared with a collusive environment resulting from the adoption of a 
confirmed strategies protocol, which is explained in detail below. 
As explained in the underlying theoretical framework, the quality of water reaching 
the final consumer is not directly controlled by any one of the agents in the market. 
Instead, it is the result of bidding behaviour by the two agents controlling the resources. 
Their only strategic variable is the minimum price at which they are willing to sell each 
unit-block of each type of water to the consumer.
We use the model described in the previous section with the following values for the 
parameters:
 
 (i)  Recharge: (aH, aL)=(3, 3)
 (ii)  Initial and maximum stock sizes (SH, SL)=(20, 20) 
 (iii)  Water qualities: (QH, QL)=(5, 1) 
 (iv)  Minimum quality standard demanded by the household: Qmin = 3
The specific utility and cost functions used are provided in Appendix A. To avoid 
subjects making uncontrolled guesses concerning the end of the session, a deterministic 
end game horizon was used (a total of 50 periods), which was known by subjects from 
the beginning of the experiment.6
Each subject knew the type of water they would have to manage over the entire 
session. furthermore, they were conscious about a generic preference by consumers 
for one good (high quality) over the other. Moreover, they knew that each water quality 
is a demand substitute (though not perfect) of the other and that their extraction cost 
structures were identical to each other’s. A simulator (made available to them on their 
decision screen) informed them on the hypothetical costs and gains they would make if 
they sold all the units of each product for which they were currently submitting post bids. 
They knew that the actual number of units they sold would be known only after they had 
posted their period bids and that the (automated) demand’s reaction to these bids was 
announced to them on the feedback screen.
In a two-treatment design, we analyse two different scenarios concerning the mana-
gement of the two sources of water. In the first treatment, labelled as Private Duopoly 
(PD), subjects act as one of the two suppliers who act independently from each other 
(using a different PC each), posting simultaneously their pricing schedules in the form 
 6 Given the complex nature of the problem faced by our subjects, we chose a 50-period horizon in order 
to allow for sufficient learning to be acquired during the session.
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of 5 minimum prices at which they are willing to sell each one of a maximum of 5 units 
they may supply to the market. Subjects were told that offer bids had to exceed weakly 
the cost of the corresponding unit, and offers of subsequent units would have to be non-
decreasing. Subjects were rewarded according to their accumulated profits over the 50 
periods of the experiment. Thus, the two sources of water are separately managed by 
two different subjects representing two profit maximizing firms. 
In the second treatment, labelled as Coordinated Duopoly (CD), the two resources 
are also managed by different subjects. However, each pair of “competing” subjects sits 
in front of the same terminal. They have to post bids exactly in the same way as in the 
standard duopoly treatment, with the only difference that each subject can observe the 
bids announced by the rival supplier for the following period. Strategies are not submitted 
unless both subjects agree to press the “oK” button. This happens after having observed 
iteratively the strategies announced by the other supplier and correcting as many times 
as necessary their own price bids. To our knowledge, this protocol is the first experimen-
tal implementation of a duopolistic game with confirmed strategies. In the Appendix, we 
provide an example of the anti-competitive effects of confirmed-strategy bargaining on 
the equilibrium of a prisoners’ dilemma game. Our design implicitly assumes that this 
result would carry over to a dynamic and complex duopolistic setup like the one studied 
here. However, there are no theoretical results available on this intuition. 
Furthermore, our experiment is the first to use the confirmed-strategy mechanism 
as a means of implementing an anti-competitive environment in the lab instead of the 
usual oral or on-line communication protocols. as we will see in the following section, 
communication and agreement on the timing of decision submission and the possibility 
of iterated inspection of the “competitor’s” strategy before jointly pressing the “oK” button 
render this setup highly collusive. However, individual actions and incentives remained 
uncoordinated and no side payments were feasible. 
Given each bidding schedule posted by the entities selling water, consumer surplus 
maximization determines the quantity of each quality consumed and, thus, the average 
quality of water. This is a rather complex problem especially due to the uncoordinated 
action of sellers, but also due to the dynamic nature of the market. The method used 
to determine the market clearing price is a combination of block-rate and uniform pri-
cing in the following sense: Suppliers post block-rate bids to the market, but the market 
clears through a uniform price determined by the price-bid of the “last” block of each 
type of water consumed by the users. To implement this price formation mechanism, we 
programmed a “smart” agent representing the users. The agent allocates water among 
farmers and households in a way that maximizes consumer surplus conditional to the 
block-rate bids posted by the suppliers of the two different types of water. Therefore, des-
pite the independent profit-driven action of suppliers, our setup assumes and implements 
conditional collective optimality of actions on behalf of the consumers.
The resulting feedback from the demand model is difficult to interpret by the subjects or “linea-
rize” in any sense. unit extraction costs increase in “steps” as the level of stock of each water 
quality decreases. Therefore, in each period costs depend on extraction in previous periods.
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a history window displays all past outcomes regarding each supplier’s own decisions, 
i.e. quantities, payoffs and market prices. Each subject also receives the clearing price at 
which the “other” water quality was sold. 
The experiment was organized using the software Hydromanagement which was 
developed in Java for the Laboratorio de Economía Experimental (LEE) of the universi-
tat Jaume I of Castellón (Spain), where all sessions were run. Five 20-subject sessions 
(a total of 5x10=50 duopolies) were run under treatment PD and two 40-subject ses-
sions (a total of 2x20=40 duopolies) were run under treatment CD. a number of learning 
rounds (not reported here) were run at the beginning of each session. In order for “social 
learning” to be avoided, sessions from different treatments were run in a random order. 
Sessions lasted an average of 80 minutes each. In all treatments, the subjects’ monetary 
rewards were proportional to their accumulated profits over the 50 periods. Average per 
subject earnings were slightly below 25€. 
results
The results are presented in figures 2 to 7. Comparison of figures 2 and 3 indicates that 
the collusive duopoly has restricted the output (reflected on higher stocks) of high qua-
lity water more than the standard duopoly. Whereas, the standard duopolistic structure 
figure2.
Private vs. Coordinated Duopoly: Evolution of average stocks (low quality)
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figure 3. 
Duopoly vs. Coordinated Duopoly: Evolution of average stocks (high quality)
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Table 1.
 Descriptive statistics from the last 30 periods
Low Q. Stock High Q. Stock Low Q. Quantity High Q. Quantity
pd cd pd cd pd cd pd cd
average 12.4 11.2 11.1 12.2 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.9
Std. d. 1.2 1.2 1.2 0.9 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
Av. 20-50 11.7 10.9 10.5 12.0 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8
St.D.20-50 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3
Low Quality Price High Quality Price Av. Quality/Price
pd cd pd cd pd cd
average 69.8 96.7 75.7 98.6 0.04 0.04
Std. d. 5.2 12.8 8.1 11.7 0.01 0.01
Av. 20-50 72.2 102.9 80.0 103.8 0.04 0.03
St.D.20-50 3.6 4.4 5.3 4.3 0.00 0.00
pd: private duopoly; cd: coordinated duopoly.
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Figure 5.
Duopoly vs. Coordinated Duopoly: Evolution of prices (high quality water)
	  
	  
figure 4.
Duopoly vs. Coordinated Duopoly: Evolution of prices (low quality water)
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Figure 6.
Duopoly vs. Coordinated Duopoly: Evolution of quantities (low quality) 
has lead to lower output (higher stocks) of low quality water than is done in the case 
of coordinated duopolies. Figures 4 and 5 indicate that prices for both types of water 
have been significantly higher in the case of coordinated duopolies, which confirms the 
anti-competitive nature of this type of market. In table 1 we present some descriptive 
statistics.
Figures 6 and 7 show that since the early periods experimental subjects sell as many 
units of each resource as the inflow provides. They thus closely follow the temporal 
pattern dictated by the hydrological equilibrium of the system, according to which input 
should equal output for the stocks to remain stable across periods. obviously, volatility is 
a non- negligible problem of water management under both market mechanisms.
The quantities traded in each period are on average not significantly different from 
the socially optimal levels which coincide with the hydrological equilibrium of the system 
described by the rule of equality between inflow and consumption.
Figure 8 contains the evolution of average quality-to-price ratios defined by the magnitude:
 
P
Q , where:       and 
Although most of the differences are not significant, the coordinated duopoly treatment 
has yielded systematically lower quality-to-price ratios.
	  
€ 
Q = KH ⋅ QH +KL ⋅ QLKH +KL
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figure 7.
Duopoly vs. Coordinated Duopoly: Evolution of quantities (low quality) 
figure 8.
Duopoly vs. Coordinated Duopoly: Evolution of Quality to Price Ratio
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Summarizing the results reported above, we can say that in our framework, collusive 
(i.e. coordinated) duopolistic water markets are less efficient than duopolistic markets 
with independently acting water suppliers. High stock level and prices are observed for 
both the cases, with the coordinated duopoly showing relatively lower stock level, while 
more moderate inefficiencies are reflected on lower quality-to-price ratios.   
coNclusioNs
contrary to previous experimental studies on resource markets, our setup assumes 
extraction from separate pools and competition in the distribution stage. This structure is 
inspired by the problem, of growing importance in many countries, concerning the desi-
rability of water management decentralization through the use of market mechanisms. 
A general finding is that prices are useful in allocating water resources. Furthermore, 
private management could suffer from an increased concern not to overexploit the resou-
rces. However, more competitive markets yield higher levels of market efficiency and 
moderately higher quality to price ratios. 
Whether the complexity of the problem and the resulting feedback induce a persistent 
learning shortcoming or not is not answered by our results so far. Therefore, an interes-
ting extension of the experiments presented here would be to allow for longer sessions, 
or running future sessions with experienced subjects.
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APPeNdix 
Mathematical model
We provide here the specific mathematical expressions used here to implement the 
model outlined in the main text. The household’s utility is given by the following function:
where the last term in brackets denotes the purification costs:
The farmer’s utility function is as follows: 
resource i’s (i = H, L) extraction costs of iK units is denoted by )( ii KC , containing 
information on the cost of extracting one unit of the resource from a given stock level. 
for the discrete case implemented here, this information is summarized in the Table 3 of 
extraction costs, below.  Given the quantity restriction of 5 units and the discrete quantity 
space allowed, the following utility levels in table 2 were assigned to the household (h) 
and the farmer (F) populations: 
€ 
Uh (KHh,KLh ,QMh ) = 205⋅ ln 1+ (max{Qmin,QMh}+ (KLh +KHh )).(KLh +KHh ) −CΔQh( )
	  
€ 
UF (KHF ,KLF ,QMF ) =170⋅ ln 1+ 0.5⋅ (QMF + 3⋅ (KLF +KHF ))⋅ (KLF +KHF )[ ]
Table 2. 
Utility levels assigned to households and Farmers for the five first units of the two water qualities
hous. Low 0 1 2 3 4 5
High 0 0 174 301 356 378 378
1 399 492 579 637 679 711
2 555 624 690 753 797 832
3 660 717 771 822 869 906
4 740 789 836 880 920 959
5 806 849 890 929 965 999
Farmer Low 0 1 2 3 4 5
High 0 0 187 354 471 560 631
1 274 391 491 572 639 696
2 422 509 584 647 702 749
3 525 594 655 707 753 794
4 604 662 712 757 798 834
5 668 717 761 801 836 869
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iNstructioNs7 
Treatments PD and CD
The aim of this experiment is to study how people make their decisions in certain con-
texts. Your decisions in the scenario explained below in detail, will be directly related to 
a monetary reward you will receive in cash at the end of the experiment. any doubt you 
may have will be clarified personally to you by one of the organizers after you raise your 
hand. Beyond these questions, any other communication is strictly forbidden and is sub-
ject to immediate exclusion from the experiment. 
You participate in a market consisting of the following features:
• There are two producers (1 and 2) and two commodities (product H and product 
L). Specifically, product H is water of High quality, while product L is water of Low 
quality. products H and L are substitutes, namely, consumers may, to a certain 
extent, substitute one type of water with the other.
• You are one of the two producers in this market. at the beginning of the session, 
the computer will indicate if you are producer 1 or 2. Your competitor will be one 
(always the same) of the subjects in this room, randomly selected by the com-
puter when the session starts [Treatment CD: your competitor is the person who 
sits next to you]
• There are two types of consumers: households and farmers. although they have 
different preferences with respect to the two types of water, they all prefer water of 
high quality (product H) to water of low quality (product L). That is, they are willing 
to pay more for H than for L.
• The market will last for 50 rounds.
Decision Making
Your only decision as a producer is announcing the minimum price at which you are 
willing to sell each one from a maximum of 5 units you may sell of your product. Such 
announcements of minimum prices are called price bids. In order to make your decisions, 
you have to take into account that:
1. The extraction cost per additional unit extracted and by product is included in 
the “table of costs” bellow. Therefore, cost conditions for you and your competitor are 
identical, and they are expressed in ExCUs, a fictitious Experimental Currency Unit.
 7 The instructions to subjects were originally written in Spanish. Here we include a unified translated ver-
sion for the two treatments, emphasizing the details that are specific to each one of them. 
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2. Taking into account the cost structure in the table, you have to announce five 
minimum prices at which you are willing to sell each unit of the five units of your product. 
Therefore, your decision making consists of fixing 5 price bids for your product.
3. You should have in mind that, in order not to make any losses, price bids cannot 
be lower than the corresponding unit cost presented in the table.
4. price bids cannot be decreasing. That is, your bid for the 1st unit cannot be higher 
than your bid for the 2nd unit; the bid for the 2nd cannot be higher than the bid for the 3rd 
unit, and so on and so forth.
5. Observe in the table that the unit costs decrease with the stock size. At the begin-
ning of the session, you have an initial stock size of 20 units. at the beginning of each 
round, you get three more units. 
6. Your stock size can never exceed 20 units and, therefore, once 20 units are rea-
ched, any additional units you may receive are lost. 
Example 
Suppose that at the end of a round your stock size is 9 units. at the beginning of the new 
round, you get your additional 3 units (so that your stock now is 12 units). Observe in the 
table that, for a stock size of 12 units, the unit cost for the first five units extracted is the 
following:
• the cost of the 1st unit: 2 Excus   
• the cost of the 2nd unit: 4 Excus
• the cost of the 3rd unit: 7 Excus
• the cost of the 4th unit: 11 Excus
• the cost of the 5th unit: 18 Excus
Table 3. 
Unit extraction costs for the two water qualities
Stock size 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11
Unit cost 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 4
Stock size 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Unit cost 7 11 18 30 50 82 135 223 368 607
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In order not to make losses, each one of your bids should not be lower than the 
corresponding unit cost. Therefore, in this example, your bid for the 1st unit should not 
be lower than 2 ExCUs (cost of the 1st unit); your bid for the 2nd unit should not be lower 
than neither 4 ExCUs (cost of this unit) nor your bid for the 1st unit; your bid for the 3rd 
unit should not be lower than neither 7 Excus nor your bid for the 2nd unit, and so on for 
the rest of the units.
In case you sell 5 units, the stock size at the beginning of next round would be 10 
units (7 you kept plus 3 you get in the new round). If, given your bids for the five units, 
your sales are zero, your stock would be 15 units (12 you already had plus 3 you get at 
the beginning of the round).
decisioNs 
You make decisions on the minimum price at which you are willing to sell each unit of 
your product. You will fill in all the boxes that appear at your computer screen with your 
price bids. In each box, you will also get information related to the corresponding unit 
cost. The bids you submit have to be integer numbers between zero and 2000. 
although you may propose five different price bids, all units of the same type of 
water will be sold to consumers at a single price. This price will be your bid for the 
“last” unit sold of each product. The number of units sold each period is calculated 
by a program which simulates the optimal behaviour of consumers.
[Only Treatment CD] You have to make decisions for your product individually. 
However, since you share the same pc to submit your strategies, you may observe 
the decisions made by your competitor before pressing the “oK” button. Both you 
and your competitor have to agree on the moment in which you press the “oK” 
button, which means that you both have finished your own decision making process. 
Example
In the example above, assume that your bids for your product are: 10 (for the 1st unit), 
12 (for the 2nd), 14 (for the 3rd), 16 (for the 4th) and 20 (for the 5th). Given your bids, the 
program which simulates the optimal behaviour of consumers determines that 3 units of 
this product will be sold. The price at which you will sell the three units will be your bid for 
the 3rd unit, that is, 14 Excus. 
tHe Profits
Your net profit of selling each unit of a product will be the difference between the market 
price at which you sold all units (your unit income) and the corresponding unit extraction 
cost. Total profits will be the sum of the unit profits for all periods.
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Example
Taking again the previous example, if, at the beginning of a round, your stock size is 12 
units, your total profits in that round will be 29 ExCUs, which are decomposed as follows:
i) 12 Excus for the 1st unit sold (14 ExCUs you receive for that unit minus 2 ExCUs 
it costs you extracting it).
ii) 10 Excus for the 2nd unit sold (14 ExCUs you receive for that unit minus 4 ExCUs 
it costs you extracting it).
iii) 7 Excus for the 3rd unit sold (14 ExCUs you receive for that unit minus 7 ExCUs 
it costs you extracting it). 
tHe iNformAtioN
during decision making, the computer will provide you with a table simulating results con-
ditional to your bid and cost for the corresponding unit in five possible scenarios: a) In case 
you only sell the 1st unit; b) If you just sell the first two units; …e) In case you sell 5 units. 
At the end of each round, the computer screen will show you the total profits obtained 
in that round, including information about unit cost, market price and number of units sold 
of each product, as well as your rival’s price.
during the experiment, you will be provided with a screen containing the history of past 
rounds (market price for each product, number of units sold, total revenue and total profits. 
moNetAry rewArd
Your monetary reward at the end of the session will be the sum of your profits accu-
mulated in 15 rounds (randomly selected by the computer) of the total of 50 rounds, 
at an equivalence rate of 500 ExCUs=1 Euro. You will be paid in cash at the end of the 
session.
In order to make sure you understood correctly the market described above, we will 
proceed next to run a pilot session of 5 rounds. Please, feel free to make any questions 
you may have during this pilot session.
Thank you for your collaboration. Good luck! 
oN GAmes witH coNfirmed strAteGies 
Following Attanasi et al. (2011) we describe in this part of the appendix the prisoner’s 
dilemma game with confirmed proposals. Consider the following payoff matrix correspon-
ding to a static prisoners’ dilemma with the well-known dominant strategy equilibrium (A, 
S) played by two players, 1(rows) and 2(columns) in the following way: 
rIS, vol. 70. EXTra 1, 189-213, marZo 2012. ISSN: 0034-9712  DOI 10.3989/rIS.2011.09.20
maNaGING a duopolISTIc WaTEr marKET WITH coNfIrmEd propoSalS • 213 
The dynamic game with confirmed proposals works as follows: Player 1 announces 
a strategy from the set {a, B}. player 2 observes the announcement and chooses to 
announce a strategy from the set {S, D} subject to 1’s confirmation of the announced 
strategy. If player 1 confirms the initial strategy, the bargaining process ends in a ‘confir-
med agreement’ and strategies are played as announced. otherwise, player 1 may not 
confirm the strategy profile resulting from his initial announced strategy and 2’s response 
to it. Then, a different strategy is announced in response to 2’s previously announced 
strategy. If player 2 confirms the strategy profile, the game ends as explained before, 
otherwise 2 may not confirm the resulting strategy profile and make a new proposal. 
This procedure continues until an agreement is reached by a player’s confirmation of his 
announced strategy and his rival’s response to it. This is a dynamic game with complete 
and perfect information that can be represented in the following way:  
The arrows drawn in thin (light) lines correspond to actions which are not going to 
be chosen by the corresponding player. Thus, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
(SPNE) of the game is the cooperative (Pareto optimal) strategy profile (B, D). Therefore, 
the SPNE of the “confirmed strategies” version of a prisoners’ dilemma is the cooperative 
(Pareto optimal) outcome.  
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